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The evolutionary origin of human
hyper-cooperation
J.M. Burkart1, O. Allon2, F. Amici3, C. Fichtel4, C. Finkenwirth1, A. Heschl5, J. Huber6, K. Isler1, Z.K. Kosonen1,
E. Martins1, E.J. Meulman1, R. Richiger1, K. Rueth1, B. Spillmann1, S. Wiesendanger1 & C.P. van Schaik1
Proactive, that is, unsolicited, prosociality is a key component of our hyper-cooperation, which
in turn has enabled the emergence of various uniquely human traits, including complex
cognition, morality and cumulative culture and technology. However, the evolutionary
foundation of the human prosocial sentiment remains poorly understood, largely because
primate data from numerous, often incommensurable testing paradigms do not provide an
adequate basis for formal tests of the various functional hypotheses. We therefore present
the results of standardized prosociality experiments in 24 groups of 15 primate species,
including humans. Extensive allomaternal care is by far the best predictor of interspeciﬁc
variation in proactive prosociality. Proactive prosocial motivations therefore systematically
arise whenever selection favours the evolution of cooperative breeding. Because the human
data ﬁt this general primate pattern, the adoption of cooperative breeding by our hominin
ancestors also provides the most parsimonious explanation for the origin of human
hyper-cooperation.
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C
ompared with other primates, including the other great
apes, humans show extremely intensive cooperation,
which is increasingly recognized as being ultimately
responsible for our unusual cognition, technology and
culture1–3. A variety of mechanisms underlie this unusual level
of cooperation. High social tolerance and reactive prosociality, as
shown in empathy-based targeted helping where individuals
respond to signs and signals of need by others, are clearly
important4. But since these may also be found in other great
apes5,6, they are evidently not sufﬁcient to support human-like
cooperativeness. Some have instead argued that a proactively
prosocial motivation, also called other-regarding preference, is
the critical mechanism enabling human cooperation3. In
proactive prosociality, individuals spontaneously assist others,
for instance by provisioning, without direct gains for themselves
and without being solicited. Recent years have seen a growing
number of studies assessing proactive prosociality in nonhuman
primates. Taken together, these studies5,6 revealed its presence in
some nonhuman species, but not in our closest living relatives,
the other great apes. The patchy distribution of proactive
prosociality across species is suggestive of convergent evolution,
raising the question whether the prevalence of proactive
prosociality across primate species can be attributed to a
particular socioecological factor. If this conjecture is conﬁrmed,
the same explanation could also account for the evolution of
human proactive prosociality, and we would not need uniquely
human evolutionary mechanisms, such as cultural evolution
or gene-culture coevolution2,3 to explain its origins in our species.
Various hypotheses have been put forward to explain
interspeciﬁc variation in proactive prosociality, including that it
is contingent on high cognitive ability7,8, high social tolerance9,
the need to coordinate behaviour in the context of foraging1,10,11,
strong social bonds or allomaternal care7,12–14. So far, however, it
has been impossible to test these hypotheses because the available
data lack comparability5, for three main reasons. First, in
humans, sharing, helping and comforting follow distinct
developmental trajectories15 and are regulated by different
neural mechanisms16. Hence, these different mechanisms may
have independent evolutionary histories. The various paradigms
used to assess prosocial behaviour in nonhuman primate species
may therefore have tested for different kinds of prosocial
behaviour17,18, such as for reactive prosociality in targeted
helping tasks and proactive prosociality in dyadic provisioning
games, in which individuals can opt to provide food to a partner
at no or some small cost. Since the focus here is on proactive
prosociality, only a subset of prosociality studies, covering a small
number of species, would be available to test the various
functional hypotheses. Second, it has become evident that
prosociality studies are highly susceptible to seemingly trivial
methodological differences6, even within a single paradigm.
Recent reviews have shown that some widely used dyadic
provisioning games to assess proactive prosociality can yield
markedly different outcomes due to small differences in payoff
distributions19 or payoff representations (for example, tokens
versus real rewards7,20,21). Third, studies differ with regard to
whether dyads were preselected according to speciﬁc criteria, to
make it more likely to detect prosocial behaviour in a species22,23.
While such procedures are valid in studies aiming at a proof-of-
principle, they hamper quantitative comparisons across studies
and thus across species. Thus, despite a large number of
prosociality studies produced over the last years, it remains
difﬁcult to distinguish true species differences from differences
that result from methodological heterogeneity of the respective
studies5,6.
To identify the evolutionary forces that may drive proactive
prosociality, we ﬁrst measured proactive prosociality in a large
number of species with a strictly standardized and previously
validated experimental design24. In this group service paradigm,
individuals are tested in their social group and can provide fellow
group members with food without obtaining any food for
themselves. We applied this test to 24 social groups of 15 primate
species, ranging from lemurs (two species) to New World
monkeys (seven species), Old World monkeys (two species) and
apes (four species, including Homo sapiens). In a second step, we
examined correlated evolution between proactive prosociality and
several socioecological factors hypothesized to contribute to
variation in this trait. To disentangle the explanatory value of all
the hypothesized factors, we used phylogenetic linear regressions
models to control for phylogenetic non-independence of the
species values, and an information-theoretic approach to model
selection. To establish the general primate pattern, we initially
analysed the impact of each of the potentially relevant factors in a
data set that only contained nonhuman species. We then added
the data on humans to test whether our species ﬁts the general
primate pattern.
According to the ﬁrst hypothesis, proactive prosociality is
cognitively demanding and thus constrained by cognitive abilities,
in particular those related to Theory of Mind reasoning7,8.
As a proxy for cognitive ability, we included overall brain size
in the analyses, as it is tightly linked to various measures of
cognitive performance in nonhuman primates25. Alternatively,
proactive prosociality may be cognitively demanding because it
requires inhibitory control to suppress the pre-potent tendency
to consume the food oneself. The presence of ﬁssion–fusion
dynamics in social organization has previously been identiﬁed as
an important convergent factor for the evolution of inhibitory
control26, and was thus also included in our analyses.
Second, variation in proactive prosociality among
primates may be linked to social tolerance. According to the
self-domestication hypothesis9, prosocial behaviour arises
as a correlated by-product of natural selection for
increased tolerance and against aggression. We therefore also
assessed social tolerance in each group and included it in our
analyses.
Third, the need to coordinate behaviour in the context of
foraging has been argued to drive proactive prosociality1,10,11.
Among nonhuman primates, the highest coordination in foraging
activity occurs in cooperative hunting. We therefore also included
the presence of cooperative hunting as an explanatory variable in
our models.
Fourth, prosociality may be most prevalent among partners
with strong social bonds. The strength of social bonds varies
among primate species, and also whether they occur predomi-
nantly among males27, among females28 or in mated pairs. These
strong bonds are typically accompanied by cooperation, which
may produce species differences in proactive prosociality. We
therefore included these various types of social bonds as factors in
our analyses. Because within a species, prosociality may only be
expressed within the respective bond classes, we also examined
intraspeciﬁc patterns and analysed in the relevant species whether
proactive prosociality was over-represented in male–male dyads,
female–female dyads or pair mates.
Fifth, the cooperative breeding hypothesis predicts that
proactive prosociality is linked to the amount of allomaternal
care (care by non-mothers) provided to offspring7,12–14. For
cooperative breeding to work, caretakers must proactively seek
opportunities to provide food or other forms of help12. Indeed,
within nonhuman primates, systematic proactive food sharing
only occurs naturalistically in cooperatively breeding callitrichid
monkeys, who also show the highest levels of allomaternal care18.
We estimated the extent of allomaternal care through an updated
version of a previously developed allocare score29, which was
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highly correlated with various other ways of quantifying
allomaternal care.
Our results demonstrate that the extent of allomaternal care
provides the best explanation for the distribution of proactive
prosociality among primate species, including humans. This
conclusion is not affected when using different ways of
quantifying allomaternal care. Importantly, we ﬁnd no support
for any of the other hypotheses, even when more reﬁned analyses
of within-species, dyad-level variation are conducted. The
adoption of extensive allomaternal care by our hominin ancestors
thus provides the most parsimonious explanation for the origin of
human hyper-cooperation.
Results
Reliabilities. We assessed the inter-rater reliabilities by a rater
who was not the experimenter of the respective group, for 10% of
all of the 389 test sessions, which included 50% of all videos of
test sessions 4 and 5 of phase IV, on which the main analyses
were based. The reliabilities for the transfers ranged between
Cohen’s Kappa¼ 0.89 and 1 per test session, with an average of
0.99 (s.d.¼ 0.03); the reliabilities for the reaching data ranged
between 0.67 and 0.83 (average¼ 0.75, s.d.¼ 0.07). All analyses
were based on the data from the ﬁrst rater.
Between-species variation in proactive prosociality. In non-
human primates, among the various potential factors
(Supplementary Tables 1–3), allomaternal care emerged as the
best predictor in unifactorial analyses of the interspeciﬁc variation
in proactive prosociality (Table 1, Fig. 1), along with weakly
signiﬁcant effects of social tolerance and pair bonds (both posi-
tive) and brain size (negative; Fig. 2). Moreover, in all models
containing a combination of any two of these factors, as well as
their interactions, allomaternal care emerged as the only
signiﬁcant effect on proactive prosociality, whereas none of the
interaction effects were signiﬁcant (Supplementary Table 4). The
best-ﬁtting model, chosen according to the lowest value of the
Akaike Information Criterion corrected for small sample size,
included allomaternal care only (Fig. 1, Table 1).
In the next step, we repeated the same analyses after adding the
results from the human subjects (three groups of 4:5–7:1-year-old
Kindergarten children) into the nonhuman primate data set.
As in the previous data set, the best model only included
allomaternal care. Unifactorial effects were again present for
social tolerance and pair bonds, but lost most of their explanatory
power in two-factorial models that also included allomaternal
care (Supplementary Table 5).
To assess how well the human data ﬁt the general primate
pattern, we also calculated the standardized residuals for all
species (mean¼ 0, s.d.¼ 1), including humans, relative to the
regression line based on nonhuman primates only. Humans
deviated from this regression line by less than one s.d. (0.85),
indicating that they do not represent an outlier and therefore
follow the general primate pattern. Thus, allomaternal care
provides the best explanation for the distribution of proactive
prosociality among primate species, including humans.
Importantly, these results are robust to different ways of
quantifying allomaternal care (Supplementary Table 6).
Dyad-level variation in proactive prosociality. Because some
of these alternative hypotheses also make predictions regarding
variation within the groups, more reﬁned tests of dyad-level
patterns are also possible. First, if proactive prosociality is linked
to male bonding, we expect more transfers between male–male
dyads in male-bonded species (spider monkeys: Ateles geoffroyi;
chimpanzees: Pan troglodytes) than between other types of dyads.
However, in test sessions 4 and 5 of phase IV, in both species
transfers between male–male dyads did not occur more than
expected (Fig. 3; chimpanzees: w2¼ 2.48, df¼ 1, ns; spider
monkeys: absolute number of transfers too low to allow for
Table 1 | Comparative tests of the hypotheses for the evolution of proactive prosociality.
Hypothesis Test variables Delta AICc
Excl hum Incl hum
Cognitive ability Brain size 19.9 29.3
Fission fusion as proxy for inhibitory control 23.8 29.4
Social tolerance Evenness of access to highly preferred and highly clumped food across group members (J’) 18.4 20.8
Coordination of foraging activities Presence of cooperative hunting within a species 23.6 29.4
Strong social bonds* Presence of male–male bonds within a species 23.8 29.4
Presence of female–female bonds within a species 20.5 24.3
Presence of pair bonds within a species 16 19.2
Allomaternal care Extent of allomaternal care 0 0
AICc, Akaike Information Criterion corrected for small sample size; Excl hum, excluding humans; Incl hum, including humans.
Last two columns: ﬁt of unifactorial PGLS models in explaining proactive prosociality in nonhuman primates, expressed as difference in AIC value from the best-ﬁtting model, in the data set excluding and
including Homo sapiens. In both data sets, the extent of allomaternal care best predicts proactive prosociality.
*The bonding hypotheses were also not supported by within-species analyses at the dyadic level. Thus, proactively prosocial provisioning was neither more likely within male–male dyads than within
other dyad types in species with male bonding, nor within female–female dyads than within other dyad types in female-bonded species, nor between pair mates than within other dyad types in pair-
bonded species.
0
20
40
60
80
100
0 1 2 3 4
Pr
oa
ct
iv
e 
pr
os
oc
ia
lity
Extent of allomaternal care
Saguinus oedipus
Hylobates syndactylus
Pithecia pithecia
Macaca fuscata
Varecia variegata
Cebus apella, 3 groups
Saimiri sciureus
Pan troglodytes
Hylobates lar
Lemur catta Ateles geoffroyi, 2 groups
Callithrix jacchus
5 groups 
Homo sapiens
3 groups
Leontopithecus chrysomelas
Macaca silenus
Figure 1 | Proactive prosociality as a function of the extent of
allomaternal care in a sample of 15 primate species. Solid regression line:
excluding Homo sapiens; dotted regression line: including Homo sapiens.
Proactive prosociality refers to the percentage of trials with food transfers
to other group members during the last two test sessions in phase IV of the
experiment, by individuals passing control criterion 1.
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statistical testing), and the pattern of within-group variation is
thus consistent with the rejection of the male bonding hypothesis.
Second, the same prediction of a male bias in transfers results
from the cooperative hunting hypothesis, because group hunting
is predominantly biased towards males, both in chimpanzees and
capuchin monkeys27. However, in both species, transfers are not
biased towards male–male dyads (Fig. 3: capuchin monkeys:
absolute number of transfers too low to allow for statistical
testing), which is inconsistent with the cooperative hunting
hypothesis.
Third, if female bonding determined the variation in proactive
prosociality, we would expect a bias towards female–female dyads
among the female-bonded species (macaques: Macaca fuscata,
Macaca silenus; squirrel monkeys: Saimiri sciureus; ring-tailed
lemurs: Lemur catta; capuchin monkeys: Cebus apella). Overall,
transfers were rare in these species and did not allow for statistical
testing; nevertheless, the transfers that did happen were not
biased towards female–female dyads (Fig. 3 for squirrel monkeys,
capuchin monkeys and ring-tailed lemurs). In Macaca silenus, no
transfers occurred in sessions 4 and 5; in Macaca fuscata, only
seven transfers occurred, and in six of these, the juvenile daughter
of the dominant female was involved. Taken together, the within-
group variation in female-bonded species thus conﬁrms the
rejection of the female bonding hypothesis.
Finally, if pair bonding were an important independent
determinant of proactive prosociality, we would expect most
transfers to occur between pair mates. Although pulling was non-
random between dyad types in the sakis (Pithecia pithecia:
w2¼ 15.6, df¼ 1, Po0.001), the male never pulled for anybody
and transfers between the pair mates were absent. In the gibbons
(Hylobates lar), we could not test this prediction because the
breeding pair could only pull for each other (the infant was too
young to pull or take food). In the siamang (Hylobates
syndactylus) group, composed of the breeding pair and a juvenile
son, transfers were not more likely between the pair mates
(w2¼ 0, df¼ 1, nonsigniﬁcant) and all transfers were initiated
either by the father (33.3%) or the son (66.6%). In the ruffed
lemurs (Varecia variegata), no transfers occurred in test session 4
and 5. In common marmosets, transfers were also not biased
towards the breeding pair but instead occurred less than expected
by chance (w2¼ 8.5, df¼ 1, P¼ 0.004). In cotton-top tamarins
(Saguinus oedipus), the breeding female had died, so no test was
possible. Overall, then, no bias towards more transfers within the
pair bond was apparent.
The only exception was encountered in the lion tamarins
(Leontopithecus chrysomelas), where transfers were more likely
between breeders than between other dyads (w2¼ 81.27, df¼ 1,
Po0.001). However, in this group, 37.5% of the food rewards
made available through pulling within the breeding pair were
further shared with an infant, and food sharing was presumably
constrained by increasing satiation of the immature over the 70
test trials, rather than by a lack of willingness to share. This
pattern does not support the idea that pair mates exclusively
pulled for each other. Furthermore, when we removed the
breeding female from the group for an additional test session with
the remaining group members, this did not appreciably decrease
the overall number of transfers compared to the last regular test
session (98.6% in the last regular test session, compared to 90.0%
in the additional test session without the breeding female).
Taken together, these within-group ﬁndings do not support pair
bonding as the sole determinant of proactive prosociality.
The within-species, dyad-level analyses therefore likewise did
not provide support for any of the bonding hypotheses,
corroborating the result of the species-level analyses.
Discussion
The results of the between-species comparative analyses suggest
that allomaternal care best predicts proactive prosociality in
primates. This ﬁnding is corroborated by the results of the
within-species tests of dyadic patterns (see Supplementary
Discussions for details) and unlikely to be based on a
methodological artefact (see Supplementary Methods for details).
While the group service paradigm deployed here is simple and
robust, it has two limitations as compared with the usual tests
involving separated dyads. First, its statistical power is limited,
because groups (or even species) rather than individuals represent
independent data points. However, group testing ensures greater
ecological validity than dyadic tests because it assesses the
behaviour of individuals in their naturalistic context, rather than
after separation from the rest of the group; ecological validity is
crucial to testing functional hypotheses. A second weakness,
which it shares with other prosociality tests, is that it may be
sensitive to minor methodological changes (for example, size of
the apparatus or time of testing relative to last feeding). However,
these factors do not systematically covary with species in the
present data set. In fact, we explicitly controlled for such potential
effects by standardizing the methods across groups and species
through the use of identical protocols and experimental setups.
Whether changes in the protocol or experimental setup indeed
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Figure 2 | Proactive prosociality as a function of the explanatory
variables other than the extent of allomaternal care (without Homo
sapiens). The presence (n¼ 2) or absence (n¼ 12) of strong male bonds or
ﬁssion–fusion organization in a species, of strong female bonds (present in
ﬁve species, absent in nine), of cooperative hunting (present in two species,
absent in 12), of pair bonds (present in seven species, absent in seven) as
well as brain size and social tolerance. The box plots represent medians
(black horizontal lines), inter-quartile range (grey boxes), minima and
maxima (whiskers) as well as outliers (dots) *Po0.05.
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inﬂuence performance in the group service paradigm, and in
what way, remains to be established in future studies.
A more general limitation of our approach is that we used only
a single test for the proactively prosocial motivation, whereas
convergent results of multiple tests would enhance conﬁdence in
our ﬁndings. Thus, the development of a robust standardized
dyadic test, and its systematic application to multiple species,
to complement the group service approach, continues to have
a high priority. Such dyadic tests would also provide an
important complement to the tests of within-group patterns of
proactive prosociality across species applied in the group service
paradigm.
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Nonetheless, the various controls applied in the present study
indicate that it is unlikely that any artefact or systematic bias is
responsible for the strong pattern obtained here. For a more
thorough discussion of how the present results link to earlier
prosociality studies, see Supplementary Discussion.
Having established that the result obtained here is likely to
survive additional testing, we can now address its implications.
Unlike any of the other apes, humans have become cooperative
breeders, perhaps in response to moving into savannah habitats,
where immature foraging success was severely impaired14,30. The
pattern reported here therefore supports an evolutionary scenario
in which the adoption of shared childcare by our ancestors
modiﬁed our prosociality, by convergently adding a proactive
motivation, as is the rule in other primate lineages that adopt
cooperative breeding. This motivation may have transformed the
individualistic cognitive skills as present in great apes (but not in
monkeys) into the human-typical shared intentionality1, which
in turn produced cascading cognitive effects via language,
collaboration and instructed learning10.
These results therefore support the cooperative breeding
hypothesis12–14 for the evolution of this critical element of
human hyper-cooperation. A major feature of this hypothesis is
that it explains why only our hominin ancestors, and none of the
other, independently breeding great apes, took this extraordinary
evolutionary trajectory14. This hypothesis can also explain why
our hyper-cooperation also extends to non-kin. First, obligate
cooperative breeders usually contain mostly kin, that is, offspring
of the unrelated breeding pair, but when unrelated individuals
join these groups, their behaviour is often indistinguishable from
that of the related helpers22,31,32. Second, human forager groups
contain multiple mated pairs, and obligations towards the mate’s
relatives, which genetically speaking are non-relatives, are also
important. Thus, once established in our ancestors, the
proactively prosocial psychology may have become generalized
toward all in-group members33.
Finally, this general biological explanation for the origin of
human hyper-cooperation also helps delineating the contexts
in which uniquely human evolutionary processes relying on
cultural evolution, group selection, cultural group selection or
gene-culture coevolution1–3 are needed to bring about human
hyper-cooperation. Since in small face-to-face groups, hyper-
cooperation works well without additional mechanisms such as
altruistic punishment2,3, it is likely that these processes only
became necessary to maintain hyper-cooperation in large,
anonymous societies, but were not needed earlier.
Methods
Subjects. Table 2 provides an overview of the subjects that participated in the
experiment. In various institutions, we tested all subjects in their social group, in
their home cage in between the regular feedings. The animals were neither food-
nor water-deprived. As rewards, we used special treats that were highly preferred
by all group members, as established before the test. Immatures too small to handle
the apparatus or take food through the wire mesh were omitted in measures of
Table 2 | Origin and composition of the social groups tested with group service.
Species Origin Group composition
Prosimians
Lemur catta (ring-tailed lemur)* German Primate Center, Go¨ttingen, Germany 2f, 3m, 3j
Varecia variegata (ruffed lemur)* 1f, 4m, 1j
New world monkeys
Ateles geoffroyi (spider monkey)* Animaya Zoo, Merida, Mexico 5f, 3m, 5j
Ateles geoffroyi Zoo Basel, Basel, Switzerland 5f, 2m, 3j
Pithecia pithecia (saki) 3f, 1m, 1i
Saimiri sciureus (squirrel monkey) Zoo Rapperswil, Switzerland 5f, 6m, 4j, 4i
Callithrix jacchus (common marmoset)–Kaliumw Primate station of the Anthropological Institute and Museum,
Zu¨rich, Switzerland
2f, 5m
Callithrix jacchus-Jojoba 3f, 3m
Callithrix jacchus-Vreniw 5f, 2m
Callithrix jacchus-Juno 4f, 2m
Callithrix jacchus-Mina 2f, 2m
Saguinus oedipus (cotton-top tamarin)
Leontopithecus chrysomelas (lion tamarin)
Primate station of the Anthropological Institute and Museum,
Zu¨rich, Switzerland
2f, 3m
2f, 3m, 1i
Cebus apella (capuchin monkey)*,
Cebus apella*
CNR Primate Centre, Institute of Cognitive Sciences and
Technologies, Rome, Italy
3f, 3m
7f, 3m, 1i
Cebus apella Zoo al Maglio, Magliaso, Switzerland 2f, 2m, 3j, 1i
Old world monkeys
Macaca fuscata (Japanese macaque) 5f, 2m, 3j, 1i
Macaca silenus (lion-tailed macaque) Zoo Parc Overloon, Overloon, Netherlands 4f, 1m, 1j
Apes
Hylobates syndactylus (siamang)* Landestiergarten Herberstein, Stubenberg, Austria 1f, 1m, 1j
Hylobates lar (gibbon) Tiergarten Schwaigern, Leintal, Germany 1f, 1m, 1i
Pan troglodytes (chimpanzee)* 11f, 14m, 4j
Homo sapiens (humans), 4:8–5:9 years Kinderga¨rten der Stadt Zu¨rich, Switzerland 4f, 1m
Homo sapiens, 4:5–5:2 years 5f, 3m
Homo sapiens, 6:3–7:1 years 3f, 5m
f, female; i, infant; j, juvenile; m, male.
*Indicate groups with experimental experience before the group service test.
wGroups with experience with prosociality tasks.
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social tolerance and whenever the analysis involved calculation of expected values.
Other individuals who had not reached sexual maturity at the beginning of the test
were included and classiﬁed as juveniles.
The human children were tested in their Kindergarten groups, in a separate
room but in the same building as their classroom. To minimize the possibility that
socially desired behaviour would be elicited by the presence of an authority ﬁgure,
we tested human children in the absence of teachers (see also Supplementary
Methods for further details on testing human children, and Supplementary
Fig. 1).The experiments with the nonhuman primates had been approved by the
relevant authorities; those in Zurich and Basel by the Kantonales Veterina¨ramt,
under the license numbers 4389 and 2541, respectively. For the human children,
the parents gave written informed consent for their children’s participation, and
the study was approved by the Ethik-Kommission of the Kinderspital Zurich,
Unterkommission SPUK.
The group service paradigm. We used an approach explicitly developed to
provide a standardized measure of both proactive prosociality and social tolerance,
the group service paradigm24. In essence, social groups are presented with food that
is out of reach, on a board outside their home cage (Fig. 4). By pulling the handle of
the board, an individual can pull food within reach of other group members.
However, the pulling individual can never obtain the food for itself, because (i) the
food is too far away from the handle to both pull and simultaneously retrieve the
food and (ii) the board slides back automatically as soon as the handle is released.
The only way for any group member to obtain food is when some other individual
pulls the handle and holds it long enough for the group member to retrieve the
food from the board. The group service experiment consists of ﬁve phases, and
subjects have to pass predeﬁned criteria to enter the subsequent phases. Various
control conditions and criteria are an integral part of the group service approach to
ensure that the behaviour indeed qualiﬁes as proactive prosociality24.
The group service paradigm provides comparable data due to the
standardization of the experimental procedure, but also has additional advantages.
First, the setup is cognitively non-demanding, and even small-brained primate
species, like callitrichid monkeys, can demonstrably understand it and pass all
necessary control conditions24. Second, the test does not require that individuals be
separated from their group mates, which may especially affect performance in
highly interdependent species. Third, the test quantitatively assesses the degree of
proactive prosociality as it occurs in a naturalistic situation, rather than in speciﬁc
dyads or under speciﬁc circumstances. Fourth, phase II of the group service
paradigm also provides a repeatable measure of social tolerance in the group
concerned.
Apparatus and procedure. The apparatus consisted of a board placed outside the
wire mesh of the home cage. A food bowl could be placed on top of the board
(Fig. 4). If it was placed in position 0, a subject could pull the handle with one hand
and access the food with the other hand. However, if the bowl was placed in
position 1, which was always located more than two arms’ lengths away from
position 0, the subject pulling the handle was no longer able to access the bowl by
herself. Position 0 was used in training and motivation trials, position 1 in test
trials. Importantly, the board was mounted on inclined rails that ran perpendicular
to the mesh, so that the board would slide down away from the cage unless it was
pulled by the handle. Only if it was pulled by one individual and held in place close
to the wire mesh would its content become accessible to the remaining subjects in
the home cage. Successful food provisioning in the group service test thus required
that one individual left the position closest to the food, moved to the position in
front of the handle and pulled and held it in a way that was sufﬁciently coordinated
to allow a second individual to retrieve the food.
The group service test was composed of ﬁve distinct experimental phases, and
subjects had to pass predeﬁned criteria to enter the subsequent phase.
Phase I, Habituation—The aim of phase I was to habituate the subjects to the
apparatus, the basic procedure and the experimenter. The board with the food bowl
in position 0 was ﬁxed close to the wire mesh so that subjects could freely access
the bowl without having to pull the apparatus. Pieces of favourite foods (minimum
10 pieces per subject) were provided sequentially in position 0 during 5 days, or
until every subject had taken at least three pieces. In each trial, a piece of food was
held up by the experimenter who drew the subjects’ attention to it verbally by
saying: ‘look here’! This attention-getting procedure assured that all subjects of a
group would pay attention to the setting, independent of cage size, and was used in
all phases of the experiment. If necessary, dominant individuals were distracted
from the apparatus by a second experimenter to make sure that all individuals
would approach the apparatus.
Phase II, Social tolerance—In phase II, we quantiﬁed social tolerance in the
feeding context, by placing 35 pieces of favourite food, one at a time, on the
apparatus ﬁxed within reaching distance of the subjects, as in phase I. When a piece
of food was taken by an individual, we waited until the food was completely
consumed before starting the next trial by saying ‘look here!’ and placing the next
piece of food in the bowl. We recorded the percentage of food items received by
each group member and calculated the evenness J’ of this distribution34, as a
measure of how equitable food was obtained by group members, and thus, how
good the odds of subordinates were of having access to the food. When food was
shared (passively or actively), it was counted as food received by both group
members involved, independently of the amount of food eaten by each individual.
To assess the repeatability of this measure of social tolerance, we conducted this
test twice, on two consecutive days. Across the 24 primate groups, the evenness of
the distribution on day one was strongly correlated with that on day two
(r2¼ 0.722, Po0.001), which provides evidence for high repeatability of this
measure of social tolerance. For the main analyses, we calculated the amount of
social tolerance of each group based on the combined data of both days.
Phase III, Training—In phase III, the subjects learned to pull the handle and
hold it to retrieve the food. The board was now in its original position, at some
distance from the wire mesh, such that only the handle could be reached. Criterion
was reached when the subjects were able to pull the handle, hold it with one hand
and take food with the second hand, with the food bowl placed within one arm’s
length from the handle (Fig. 4, position 0). Pieces of food were provided until each
subject passed the criterion of pulling the food within reach for itself in at least
seven trials (again, if necessary after distracting dominant individuals). For
individuals who had difﬁculties in learning the task, we added intermediate steps,
such as placing the food on top of the handle, directly in front of the handle, near
the handle with increasing distances to it and ﬁnally in the food bowl. Passing the
criterion of phase III corresponds to passing the knowledge probe that individuals
did understand how the apparatus worked.
Phase IV, Group service—In phase IV, the core of the group service experiment,
we measured proactive prosociality. The board was in its original position as in
phase III, but food was now placed in position 1, too far away for an individual to
pull the board and at the same time retrieve the food for itself. Essentially, we
assessed how much food each group was able to make available to its members,
which required individuals to forgo the reward for themselves and instead move
away from the food to pull and hold the handle and provide the food to its
group mates.
In phase IV, we alternately ran ﬁve test sessions and ﬁve control sessions. Each
session consisted of 70 regular and 14 motivation trials. During regular trials, food
was placed in position 1 and could only become available to the group if an
individual would forgo the reward and instead pull for its group members. During
motivation trials, food was placed in position 0 and could be obtained by individual
effort (like in Phase III). Motivation trials were inserted after every 5th regular trial,
resulting in a total of 84 trials, including the very ﬁrst trial, which was also a
motivation trial. Motivation trials, which included the vocal attention getters, were
included to assess whether the animals were interested in the reward until the end
of each test, and would continue to attend to the experimental setup. If no one
Handle
Food position 1 Food position 0
Figure 4 | Group service apparatus. (a) Schematic drawing. The board with
the food bowl in position 0 or 1 is attached outside the wire mesh of the
home cage. Subjects can pull the handle to move the board to within reach
(as indicated by the grey arrow), but the board slides back if the subject
releases the handle. Subjects can pull the board and retrieve the food
themselves if the food bowl in position 0 is baited. However, food baited in
position 1 can only be made available if one individual pulls the handle and
holds the board within reach, while a second individual retrieves the food.
(b) A cotton-top tamarin (Saguinus oedipus) pulls the board to provide food in
the transparent bowl to other group members. Line drawing after still frame.
NATURE COMMUNICATIONS | DOI: 10.1038/ncomms5747 ARTICLE
NATURE COMMUNICATIONS | 5:4747 | DOI: 10.1038/ncomms5747 |www.nature.com/naturecommunications 7
& 2014 Macmillan Publishers Limited. All rights reserved.
would take the food in more than two consecutive motivation trials in less than
1min, the experimenter ended the session. In the majority of groups, all motivation
trials were always taken, both in test and control sessions (exceptions where food
was not taken in two consecutive motivation trials at least once over the ﬁve test
and ﬁve control sessions: siamangs, one group of spider monkeys, lemurs and
kattas).
During test sessions, the food bowl was baited at the beginning of each trial by
holding up the food item, attracting the group’s attention by a vocal attention getter
(‘look here!’) and conspicuously placing the food item in the bowl. The trial ended
either when the food had been provided to a group member or after 1min had
elapsed. If no food was taken in a trial, the experimenter started the next trial by
holding up the food item from the bowl again, showing it demonstratively to the
group, attracting their attention vocally and placing it back in the food bowl.
During control sessions, the food bowls were not baited with food in regular
trials. Instead, the experimenter held up a small stick, touched the bowl with it
audibly and simultaneously used the same verbal attention getter as during the
experimental trials. This control served to exclude the possibility that pulling
occurred simply to explore the apparatus itself, or as mere play behaviour. As in the
test sessions, motivation trials, in which real food was provided, were inserted after
every 5th regular trial.
Proactive prosociality was calculated as the corrected percentage of food
provisioning in the last two test sessions for each group. The last two test sessions
were chosen because by then, all subjects had had ample opportunity to learn that
they could not get the food by themselves by pulling the apparatus, which in the
very ﬁrst trials may have led to false positives. The last two test sessions thus yield
the most conservative estimate of proactive prosociality, but the results do not
change if we take the total percentage of food provisioning overall test sessions.
Furthermore, the percentage was corrected by including in this measure only
provisioning by individuals who passed the criterion of pulling signiﬁcantly more
in test versus control sessions, but note that both measures are highly correlated
(Supplementary Fig. 2).
Phase V, excluding alternative explanations for sustained provisioning—If
sustained provisioning occurred over the ﬁve test sessions in phase IV, it could still
be that transfers occurred by mistake because the pulling subjects had not
understood that they wouldn’t be able to obtain the food themselves, and had not
learnt this during the ﬁve test sessions. Even though the animals would have had
numerous opportunities to learn that pulling food in position 1 was never
rewarded, it could be argued, especially for smaller-brained species such as
callitrichids that 350 trials are not sufﬁcient to learn so. In the ﬁnal phase V, we
therefore tested this understanding, but obviously could only do so in those groups
that had shown sustained provisioning in phase IV, that is, who continued to
provide food to partners at stable rates throughout the 5 test sessions of phase IV.
Phase V was identical to phase IV, except that physical access to the food bowl
was now blocked by a ﬁne-meshed grid attached to the home cage in front of
position 1, leaving visual and olfactory cues present. Thus, even if the tray was
pulled to within reach, no one could ever obtain the food. In the sakis and in one
group of common marmosets, instead of blocking the access with a ﬁne-meshed
grid, we moved the apparatus to the edge of the cage so that the outer part of the
apparatus would overhang the length of the home cage. Thus, the apparatus could
still be pulled but the food would nevertheless not become available to the other
group members.
We again ran ﬁve test sessions (position 1 baited) and ﬁve control sessions
(position 1 empty) with the grid always in place, on alternating days. Each session
consisted of 70 trials and additional motivation trials interspersed after every 5th
regular trial (during motivation trials, food was again available and accessible in
position 0). If in phase IV, pulling the baited tray in position 1 occurred for any
reason other than intentionally providing food (for example, a persistent inability
to inhibit pulling the baited tray due to the salient visual and olfactory cues),
pulling should continue in phase V at the same level as during phase IV. However,
if pulling in phase IV occurred to provide food to group members, pulling in phase
V should decrease over time more consistently than in phase IV because pulling in
phase V did not result in providing food to group members.
Data coding and reliabilities. All sessions in phase III, IV and V were video
recorded. During the experiments, data were also collected by hand, including
whether an individual pulled or not within a given trial, whether a transfer
occurred and if so, the identity of the donor and the recipient. This data was later
veriﬁed with the video clips by the experimenter. In case of inconsistencies, the true
values based on the video clips were used. Reaching was only coded from the videos
after the experiment, for test session 5 of phase IV. For each regular trial, we coded
whether an individual tried to reach for the food in position 1 by extending its arm
(or tail in the case of spider monkeys) outside of the wire mesh in the direction of
the food reward. However, we only included reaching attempts that could be
perceived by a second individual that was close enough to reach the apparatus with
one leap (exact distances differed according to the respective species).
Validity of the group service approach. The group service paradigm requires
several criteria to be fulﬁlled to conclude that food deliveries are due to proactive
prosociality24 (see Supplementary Methods for details). First, subjects must
understand the task. They must pass various knowledge probes and control
conditions to proceed to the experiment (Supplementary Table 7). In particular, the
results must not reﬂect the absence of sufﬁcient inhibitory control. Ideally, an
alternative measure that controls for inhibitory control (that is, difference scores
for which pulling rates during control sessions are subtracted from pulling during
test sessions, Supplementary Table 8) produces the same results as those obtained
with the absolute measure used for the main analyses. Second, species with high
rates of proactively prosocial pulling must maintain high rates throughout all ﬁve
test sessions, and not decline over time, as would be expected if animals
unintentionally provisioned others in the beginning and gradually learned they
were doing so (Supplementary Fig. 3). Third, we must exclude that reactive
prosociality drives the results, that is, that begging is not necessary and other signs
of need by recipients ineffective (Supplementary Fig. 4). Fourth, phase V is added
to further demonstrate the understanding of the consequences of their pulling.
However, this is only necessary for those groups passing the three criteria
mentioned above and continuing to provide food in more than 40% of all trials in
the last test session. Note that for the human children, phase V was modiﬁed
(Supplementary Methods and Supplementary Fig. 6).
Finally, one could argue that rather than testing different groups, we only assess
the behaviour of the most dominant individual per group because this is the only
individual in the group enjoying near-complete freedom in behaviour. To test this
possibility, we assessed whether the relationship between the extent of allomaternal
care and proactive prosociality also holds at the group level (GLM; response:
proactive prosociality, random effect: species. Note that phylogenetic structure can
only be taken into account in species-level analyses. However, lambda was low or 0
in most of the species-level analyses performed in the main analyses, suggesting
that phylogenetic structure has only a marginal effect in the present data set).
Conﬁrming our main conclusion, the relationship between allomaternal care and
proactive prosociality is also stable when we test at the group level (F(13,10)¼ 6.24,
P¼ 0.003, Supplementary Fig. 5).
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